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A commentary on
Bridging the gap between the other
and me: the functional role of motor
resonance and action effects in infants’
imitation
by Paulus, M., Hunnius, S., Vissers, M., and
Bekkering, H. (2011). Dev. Sci. 14, 901–910.
It has been proposed that infants
selectively imitate based on a ratio-
nal evaluation of the observed action
(“rational-imiation-account,” Gergely
et al., 2002). This view has been rejected
by Paulus et al. (2011a) proposed a
“two-stage model of infants” ability to
imitate observed action-effect contingen-
cies’. They claimed that infant imitation
depends on (1) similarity between the
infants’ and the model’s body posture;
and (2) the presence of action effects
(“two-stage-model”). However, there are
alternative explanations for Paulus et al.’s
(2011a) results that limit significant devel-
opmental conclusions regarding infant
imitation.
In the task introduced by Meltzoff
(1988), infants were presented with
a model who illuminated a lamp by
an unusual means, i.e., her head (in
the following referred to as “head-
touch”), instead of a usual means, i.e.,
her hands (hands-free condition, Gergely
et al., 2002). According to the rational-
imitation-account, infants consider others
to always use the most efficient means
to achieve a goal. Since the model
used her head although her hands were
free, infants—whose hands were never
constrained—imitated the head-touch to
explore the benefit of this action. In con-
trast, they imitated the head-touch less
often when the model had to use her head
because her hands were occupied hold-
ing a blanket (hands-occupied condition,
Gergely et al., 2002). In this condition,
infants regarded the head-touch as the
most effective means given the model’s
constraints and, since infants’ constraints
differed, not worth copying (Gergely and
Csibra, 2003, p. 291).
Paulus and colleagues (2011a) reported
four new variations on this task.
In the button condition—adapted from
a recent study (Paulus et al., 2011b)—
the blanket was held around the model’s
shoulders by a large red button instead of
her hands. Thus, the model’s hands were
free but hidden underneath the blanket.
Infants imitated the head-touch in this
condition less often than in the hands-
free condition. The authors concluded
that infants’ tendency to imitate depended
on the degree of resonance between
the observed action and the infants’
motor repertoire. This motor resonance
is stronger when the model’s action is in
the infants’ motor repertoire. Since infants
cannot perform the head-touch without
putting their hands next to the lamp, there
is not enough resonance with the model’s
action when her hands are crossed in
front of her upper body (Paulus et al.,
2011b, p. 1049). However, the manipu-
lation in the button condition is prob-
lematic for two reasons. First, although
the model highlighted that she could use
her hands before demonstrating the head-
touch (e.g., by re-arranging her chair),
it is unclear whether infants remembered
these demonstrations when the model per-
formed the subsequent head-touch. Even
if they did, it is possible they conceived
the two actions as independent intentional
events (Baldwin et al., 2001). Relatedly, the
model’s hands were not visible while she
performed the head-touch. Thus, infants
might have seen her hands as being
occupied. Since her hands were hidden
underneath the blanket, this demon-
stration resembled the demonstration in
Gergely et al.’s (2002) hands-occupied con-
dition in which infants rarely imitated the
head-touch. Second, it is unclear whether
infants understand the function of but-
tons. Although they have probably seen
buttons on jackets, infants do not neces-
sarily understand their function, especially
in the context of a blanket being wrapped
around one’s upper body.
In two of the new conditions, the
head-only and the head-effect conditions,
the blanket was held by a salient but-
ton as in the button condition when
the model performed the head-touch.
In the head-only condition, the model
demonstrated that the lamp did not light
up when she initially used her hand,
but that it did when she subsequently
used her head. The head-effect condi-
tion was identical, except that no hand
action was demonstrated. As in the but-
ton condition, significantly fewer infants
copied the head-touch in these condi-
tions compared to the hands-free condi-
tion. The authors took this as evidence
for the two-stage-model: if the model’s
action does not lead to motor resonance
then the tendency to imitate is reduced.
This mechanism works even if logical
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evaluation suggests the contrary (e.g.,
head-only: “the lamp can only be illu-
minated using the head—not the hand”).
However, the same aforementioned prob-
lems apply here: we do not know whether
infants (1) perceive the hands as being free;
and (2) understand the function of but-
tons. Noteworthy, the lamp was switched
off when it was handed to infants dur-
ing the response phase in these two con-
ditions. Infants might have perceived the
apparatus as broken when they first tested
it with their hands and, therefore, did
not imitate the head-touch. Additionally,
the rational-imitation-account makes no
clear predictions for the head-only con-
dition. The model’s constraint (i.e., fail-
ing to illuminate the lamp with the
hand) is identical to the infants’ con-
straint. This differs from the original
conditions in which either both infants
and model were unconstrained or the
model was constrained but infants were
free.
In the no-effect condition, the pro-
cedure was identical to the hands-free
condition except that the switched-off
lamp did not light up when the model
performed the head-touch. The two-
stage-model predicts that infants do
not imitate the head-touch since “a
modeled action that does not lead to
a salient effect would be unlikely to
be imitated” (Paulus et al., 2011a, p.
906). In contrast, Paulus et al. claimed
that the rational-imitation-account pre-
dicts that infants imitate the head-touch
because the action, the constraints, and
the goal were comparable to the hands-
free condition. In fact, fewer infants
imitated the head-touch in the no-effect
condition than in the hands-free condi-
tion, which was interpreted as evidence
for the two-stage-model. However, it
is questionable whether the goal (in
the sense of “external result,” Gergely
and Csibra, 2003) is identical in the
hands-free and the no-effect condi-
tion. Whereas the goal in the hands-free
condition is the illuminated lamp, the
goal in the no-effect condition is mak-
ing contact with the lamp. Since these
goals differ, it is debatable whether the
rational-imitation-account would pre-
dict the same imitative behaviour in both
conditions.
Taken together, a closer look at
Paulus et al.’s (2011a) study revealed
that alternative explanations that are
in line with the rational-imitation-
account hold for infants’ performance
in the new conditions. Additionally, we
showed that the predictions for these
new conditions are not as unambigu-
ous as proposed by the authors. We
acknowledge, however, that Paulus et al.
(2011a) earned the merit of highlight-
ing potential confounding variables in
imitation tasks (e.g., the model’s body
posture). Further research on infants’
selective imitation should conform with
the idea of carefully considering alter-
native explanations of the experimental
manipulations.
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